Security Advisory Notices 

• Dryad Global assess the risk to all commercial vessels transiting the lower Red Sea, east of the Hanish and Zubair Islands as SUBSTANTIAL.
  
• Dryad Global assess the risk to all commercial traffic calling at Saudi Red Sea ports to be heightened from MODERATE to SUBSTANTIAL.
  
• Dryad Global assess the risk to all commercial traffic calling at UAE Ports to be enhanced to from LOW to MODERATE.
  
• Dryad Global assess the risk to all Saudi and UAE flagged maritime traffic as SEVERE

On Monday 17^th January 22, Houthi rebels claimed responsibility for an attack that resulted in explosions of three petroleum tanker vehicles near the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company storage facility. The fires began in the industrial area of Musaffah and at a construction site near Abu Dhabi International Airport in the UAE capital, Abu Dhabi police said in a statement, adding that they believe the attack was carried out by drones.

This activity continues a period of heightened tensions that has seen Houthi rebels and the Saudi coalition in Yemen conduct a range of offensive activities following a successful UAE backed offensive in in Marib and Shabwah.

Within the maritime domain, Houthi rebels have successfully interdict and detained a UAE flagged vessel, (MV RWABEE) 23nm West of Ras Isa Marine Terminal. Following this the Yemen Petroleum Company (YPC) claimed that the Saudi-led coalition had diverted to a Saudi port a fifth fuel vessel heading for the Houthi-controlled port of Hodeidah.

Subsequently on the 5^th January 22, UKMTO issued an alert indicating a vessel had suffered a suspicious approach whilst in transit, northbound, 30nm west of the Yemeni port of Saleef. Subsequent investigation indicates that Liberian flagged vessel issued a distress signal having been approached by two small craft to within 1.3 cables. It is understood that embarked personnel opened fire, which resulted in a return of fire from the small vessels. No casualties were reported with the smaller vessels seen departing towards al Zubair Island.

Yemen's Houthi rebels warned that they may target more facilities in the UAE after carrying out drone and missile attacks Monday that killed three people. A spokesperson for Yemen's Houthi rebels said the group had carried out the attacks on the UAE's economic hub of Abu Dhabi in retaliation for the UAE's role in a military offensive in Yemen last week. A further statement released stated that “…from today, all countries and companies who have investments in UAE, must not consider the UAE as a safe country."

Well-developed trends indicate a clear set of attack methodologies and targeting preferences used by Houthi rebels, to both dominate their perceived area of immediate strategic influence and oppose coalition forces. These activities have predominantly manifest within the Red Sea and Saudi mainland, particularly port and energy infrastructure. To date Saudi Arabia has borne the brunt of missile and drone attacks sent from Yemen, with the last Houthi-claimed attack on the UAE in 2018. Despite this, a recent operational focus by UAE backed forces against Houthi forces looks set do destabilise a long standing tacit Houthi policy of not targeting the UAE.

In line with the increase in tensions and incidents within the maritime domain, it is assessed as likely that should the Houthi rebels seek to conduct reprisal attacks, this is likely to take the form of previously seen incidents. As such, the corresponding risk to wider commercial traffic, operating within specific areas of the Red Sea, Saudi and UAE ports and mainland is assessed to have increased.

Historically houthi rebels are known to utilise several methods of opposing Saudi forces within the area, including the boarding and detention of vessels operating in support of the Saudi coalition, the deployment of remote-controlled waterborne improvised explosive devices (RC-WBIEDs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). In addition, several groups are known to have deployed a range of sea mines throughout the coastal area.

Water-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIED) have played a role in previous attack patterns of Houthi units within the area, with particular focus on the Saudi ports Jizan and Al Shuquaiq due to their proximity to Saudi Yemen border as well as the Yemeni Port of Salif. In December 2020, an attack on a vessel at the Saudi Port of Jeddah indicated an ability of threat actors to conduct such attacks significantly beyond their normal area of operations. Such activity is assessed as likely to form part of any reprisal action conducted by Houthi forces. Where deployed, targets are likely to include Saudi and UAE maritime traffic, and vessels suspected of supporting the Saudi coalition in Yemen. The UAE is further from Yemen, and shares no borders with the country, unlike Saudi Arabia’s long border with Yemen. Despite this Houthi rebels have displayed their capability in targeting at significant distances via the use of drones. In line with previous targeting methodology, Saudi Red Sea ports and recently UAE ports, are assessed to be at increased risk of targeting via the use of WBIED and or missile / drone strikes. WBIED’s are not assessed as a persistent threat to vessels calling at UAE ports.

Previous activity by Houthi rebels has also involved the targeting of Saudi flagged vessels in transit via the use of rockets often launched within the vicinity of the Hanish Islands. A threat of naval mines has previously been reported in coastal waters between Midi, Yemen and Jizan, Saudi Arabia. Sadaf-type naval mines were discovered in May by Saudi authorities, implicating Iran in naval activities off the Yemeni coast. This continued in early June when Joint Forces squads discovered a network of mines through the Hanish Archipelago.

Recommendations: Commercial maritime traffic transiting throughout the Red Sea should ensure that all transits are conducted West of the al Zubair and Hanish islands. Full compliance with BMP5 is considered essential in areas of risk. In addition, significant outward and area lighting would serve as a suitable deterrent for both vessels at anchorage and underway. Vessels are strongly advised to keep the Automatic Information System (AIS) on.

Emergency procedures should continue to be well rehearsed and understood by all crew. Vessel masters and company CSO’s should consider protocol in respect of interaction with state / militia forces i.e Saudi coalition vessels / Houthi rebels.  In all cases vessels should comply and remain vigilant.

Whilst the risk of Houthi interaction with lawful commercial maritime traffic operating within the wider Red Sea is assessed as LOW, vessels embarking PMSC should consider the benefits of armed security against the current threat from traditional maritime crime and piracy, against risk of escalation resulting from interaction with militant forces. Houthi forces are not assessed to have the intent of interdicting or detaining lawful commercial traffic however as a result of heightened tensions are likely to act in a manner that may be commensurate with a hostile actor thus increasing the potential for miscalculation.

• Dryad Global assess the risk to all commercial vessels transiting the lower Red Sea, east of the Hanish and Zubair Islands as SUBSTANTIAL.

• Dryad Global assess the risk to all commercial traffic calling at Saudi Red Sea ports to be heightened from MODERATE to SUBSTANTIAL.

• Dryad Global assess the risk to all Saudi maritime traffic as SEVERE / CRITICAL.

On Monday 2nd January 22, Houthi rebels successfully interdicted the UAE flagged MV RWABEE 23nm West of Ras Isa Marine Terminal. Statements from the Saudi coalition in Yemen state that the vessel was inbound Jazan from the Island of Socotra, carrying medical equipment. A statement refuted by Houthi forces who released video footage allegedly showing military equipment onboard the vessel.

Statements from the US embassy in Yemen strongly condemn the vessel detention. Statements by coalition spokesperson Brigadier General Turki Al-Maliki state, “The terrorist Houthi militia will bear full responsibility as a result of its criminal act of piracy against the ship, which violates the customary International Humanitarian Law, the San Remo Manual on Armed Conflicts at Sea and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.”

“The militia must promptly release the ship, or the Coalition Forces will undertake all necessary measures and procedures to handle this violation, including the use of force if necessary.”

Following the detention of the vessel, Saudi Arabian air defences intercepted and destroyed five drones launched by the Iran-aligned Houthi forces.

The Saudi-led coalition subsequently launched air strikes on targets in Yemen's capital Sanaa in response to the vessel detention and drone attacks carried out by the Iran-aligned Houthi rebels. In addition, forces of Yemen’s internationally recognized government reclaimed large swaths of territory in the southern province of Shabwa from Iran-backed Houthi rebels.

On the 5th January 22 the Yemen Petroleum Company (YPC) claimed that the Saudi-led coalition had diverted to a Saudi port a fifth fuel vessel heading for the Houthi-controlled port of Hodeidah. Essam al-Mutawakkal, who heads the YPC in Houthi areas, said five such fuel ships that had received United Nations clearances to enter Yemen were currently being detained by the coalition.

Subsequently on the 5th January 22, UKMTO issued an alert indicating a vessel had suffered a suspicious approach whilst in transit, northbound, 30nm west of the Yemeni port of Saleef. Subsequent investigation indicates that Liberian flagged vessel issued a distress signal having been approached by two small craft to within 1.3 cables. It is understood that embarked personnel opened fire, which resulted in a return of fire from the small vessels. No casualties were reported with the smaller vessels seen departing towards al Zubair Island.

Assessment: Whilst there is no direct intelligence connecting the approach on the Liberian vessel with the ongoing increased tensions within the southern Red Sea, it is assessed as highly likely that Houthi forces are acting in a state of heightened alert resulting from the significant increase in tensions and as such it remains a realistic possibility that the event was connected.

Well-developed trends indicate a clear set of attack methodologies and targeting preferences used by Houthi rebels, to both dominate their perceived area of immediate strategic influence and oppose Saudi forces throughout the southern Red Sea. In line with the increase in tensions and incidents within the maritime domain, it is assessed as likely that should the Houthi rebels seek to conduct reprisal attacks, this is likely to take the form of previously seen incidents. As such, the corresponding risk to wider commercial traffic, operating within specific areas of the Red Sea is assessed to have increased.

Houthi rebels are known to utilise several methods of opposing Saudi forces within the area, including the boarding and detention of vessels operating in support of the Saudi coalition, the deployment of remote-controlled waterborne improvised explosive devices (RC-WBIEDs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). In addition, several groups are known to have deployed a range of sea mines throughout the coastal area.

Water-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIED) have played a role in previous attack patterns of Houthi units within the area, with particular focus on the Saudi ports Jizan and Al Shuquaiq due to their proximity to Saudi Yemen border as well as the Yemeni Port of Salif. In December 2020, an attack on a vessel at the Saudi Port of Jeddah indicated an ability of threat actors to conduct such attacks significantly beyond their normal area of operations. Such activity is assessed as likely to form part of any reprisal action conducted by Houthi forces. Where deployed, targets are likely to include Saudi maritime traffic, and vessels suspected of supporting the Saudi coalition in Yemen. In line with previous targeting methodology, Saudi Red Sea ports are assessed to be at increased risk of targeting via the use of WBIED and or missile / drone strikes.

Previous activity by Houthi rebels has also involved the targeting of Saudi flagged vessels in transit via the use of rockets often launched within the vicinity of the Hanish Islands. A threat of naval mines has previously been reported in coastal waters between Midi, Yemen and Jizan, Saudi Arabia. Sadaf-type naval mines were discovered in May by Saudi authorities, implicating Iran in naval activities off the Yemeni coast. This continued in early June when Joint Forces squads discovered a network of mines through the Hanish Archipelago.

Commercial maritime traffic transiting throughout the Red Sea should ensure that all transits are conducted West of the al Zubair and Hanish islands. Full compliance with BMP5 is considered essential in areas of risk. In addition, significant outward and area lighting would serve as a suitable deterrent for both vessels at anchorage and underway. Vessels are strongly advised to keep the Automatic Information System (AIS) on.

Emergency procedures should continue to be well rehearsed and understood by all crew. Vessel masters and company CSO’s should consider protocol in respect of interaction with state / militia forces i.e Saudi coalition vessels / Houthi rebels. In all cases vessels should comply and remain vigilant.

Whilst the risk of Houthi interaction with lawful commercial maritime traffic operating within the wider Red Sea is assessed as LOW, vessels embarking PMSC should consider the benefits of armed security against the current threat from traditional maritime crime and piracy, against risk of escalation resulting from interaction with militant forces. Houthi forces are not assessed to have the intent of interdicting or detaining lawful commercial traffic however as a result of heightened tensions are likely to act in a manner that may be commensurate with a hostile actor thus increasing the potential for miscalculation.